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Abstract
We study elicitation of subjective beliefs of an agent facing ambiguity (model un-
certainty): the agent has a non-singleton set of (first-order) priors on an event and
a second-order prior on these first-order belief-states. Such a two-stage decompo-
sition of uncertainty and non-reduction of compound lotteries resulting from non-
neutrality to the second-order distribution plays an important role in resolving the
Ellsberg Paradox. The problem of eliciting beliefs on unobservable belief-states with
ambiguity-sensitive agents is novel, and we introduce new elicitation techniques us-
ing report-dependent prize variations. We construct a direct revelation mechanism
that induces truthful reporting of the first-order belief states as well as the second-
order distribution on the belief-states as the unique best response. The technique re-
quires knowledge of the sensitivity function to second-order distribution (capturing
ambiguity attitude) and the vN-M utility function, which we also elicit.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: D81, D82
KEYWORDS: Ambiguity, second-order beliefs, elicitation of second-order beliefs (sup-
port and distribution), Klibanoff-Marinacci-Mukerji (2005) representation, elicitation
of second-order-distribution-sensitivity function, elicitation of the vN-M utility func-
tion.
1 Introduction
Second-order probabilities and attitude towards such probabilities play an important role
in explaining choice that appear anomalous under expected utility. When the data gen-
erating process is known, an agent faces only aleatory uncertainty, captured by a (sub-
jective) probability model. However, the data generating process itself might be uncer-
tain, in which case the agent faces a second layer of uncertainty over possible probability
models. Such “model uncertainty” or “ambiguity” is then captured by subjective beliefs–
referred to as second-order beliefs–over possible probability models. Non-reduction of
consequent two-stage compounding of lotteries is critical for explaining choice behavior
categorised as the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961).
Introduced by Segal (1987,1990), such non-reduction is key for representations of ambiguity-
sensitive preference axiomatised byKlibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) (KMM), Nau
(2006), Ergin and Gul (2009), Seo (2009). Consider an act aEb which pays a monetary
amount a if event E happens, and an amount b otherwise. Suppose the agent has a fi-
nite set of beliefs {µ1, . . . , µm} about E, and suppose fi is the second order belief on µi,
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Here µi ∈ [0, 1], fi ∈ (0, 1] and ∑i fi = 1. In the KMM representation, an
agent evaluates this act according to
m
∑
i=1
φ(µiu(a) + (1− µi)u(b)) fi
where φ is an increasing function and u is the vN-M utility function. The function φ
captures attitude towards ambiguity: the agent’s preference exhibits ambiguity aver-
sion, neutrality or fondness according as φ is strictly concave, linear or strictly convex.
Note that the first-order beliefs µi are the belief-states
1 with the second-order belief as
the (unique) prior over these states. Representations based on different axiomatisations
by Nau (2006), Ergin and Gul (2009), Seo (2009) have a similar structure, with attitude
towards dispersion of second-order probabilities capturing ambiguity attitude.
In this paper we use this representation class and elicit2 beliefs µi and fi, given that the
agent is sensitive to ambiguity. The precise attitude towards ambiguity is immaterial:
1In the literature, the belief-states are sometimes called second-order states, with the payoff relevant
states (E and Ec, the complement of E) being the first-order states. We do not use this terminology in the
paper - we refer to the first-order beliefs µi as belief states and to fi as the second order beliefs.
2By “elicit” we mean “to make truthful reporting of beliefs the unique best response of the agent.”
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we elicit the beliefs for any increasing function φ that satisfies a certain “smoothness”
property (explained later).3 The idea behind our methods is quite general, and could be
adapted to other settings featuring beliefs on unobservable states.
The problem of eliciting (first and second order) beliefs of an ambiguity-sensitive agent
throws up challenges that are qualitatively different from those encountered when deal-
ing with beliefs on observable events. Since the belief-states are fundamentally unobserv-
able,4 standard elicitation techniques fail to work. Indeed, as discussed in the literature
review below, all available mechanisms in the literature depend on a reward based on an
observable event and/or require the agent to be an SEUmaximizer. Therefore solving the
current problem requires new techniques.
It is worth noting that even though the belief-states are unobservable, if the set of belief-
states of an agent (i.e. the support of the second-order beliefs) were known, we could
elicit the second-order beliefs in a relatively straightforward manner using a variation of
known mechanisms (described in section 3.1). However, since these are not observable
and, except for some special cases (for example, for synthetic ambiguous events created
in a laboratory) unknown to the mechanism designer, elicitation presents a significant
challenge. In response, we introduce new techniques and conceptual innovations in de-
signing the belief-elicitation mechanism. We describe a novel direct revelation mecha-
nism in which the agent is asked to report ambiguous beliefs (the first order beliefs and
the second-order belief distribution on these belief-states) and show that the unique best
response of the agent is to report beliefs truthfully. The literature on belief elicitation on
observable states compares levels of utility from acts and lotteries. Here, with unobserv-
able states and ambiguity-sensitive agents, we show that we need to consider how utility
changes as we vary the prizes. Our mechanism constructs a test of beliefs based on report-
dependent variations in lottery prizes with the property that it is only under the truthful
report that the agent receives the most improving variation always.
3Of course, our mechanism for belief elicitation is not meant for agents who are ambiguity-neutral; the
smoothness property on φ implies that the agent cannot have ambiguity-neutral preferences. It is intuitively
obvious that when the agent is ambiguity-neutral the agent chooses as if the agent has a unique belief
regarding the likelihood of the event E (the “predictive prior”) which is what an elicitation mechanism
should be able to elicit. The standard elicitation techniques of the literature elicit this (unique) predictive
prior.
4Suppose an agent believes E will happen with probability either 1/3 or 2/3 and that these two belief-
states are equally likely. While it is possible to observe whether E happens, it is not possible to ascertain
whether E happened with probability 1/3 or 2/3 if it does happen.
2
As the literature shows, beliefs on observable events can be elicited without requiring
knowledge of the utility function of the agent. However, as noted above, our mechanism
relies on report-dependent variations in lottery prizes, and we do need to know how such
variations change the agent’s utility. Therefore, it is no longer possible to be agnostic
about the evaluation functions (in this case φ and u), and we elicit these as part of our
mechanism.
The analysis proceeds in four steps. First, we elicit the vN-M utility function u using a
scheme similar to the well-known mechanism of Becker, Degroot, and Marschak (1964).
This allows us to write all monetary payoffs as vN-M utilities, so that we can write ex-
pected utility from acts withmoney prizes as simply expected payoffs over corresponding
vN-M utilities.
Second, we present a mechanism with prize variations and show some of its properties.
We then assume φ is known and elicit beliefs (belief-states and second-order distribution)
using the mechanism. This is the main part of the paper and comprises our principal
contribution. Since our methods are new, before formally presenting our methods and
results, we explain the idea behind our belief elicitation technique in some detail in sec-
tion 3.
Third, we elicit the φ function by creating a synthetic ambiguous event (so that the set
of belief-states for that event are controlled by the mechanism designer, and the realized
belief-state is known as it is the designer’s choice) and then employing a variation of the
mechanism in Karni (2009). Finally, we set up a grand mechanism to elicit φ and beliefs
simultaneously.
1.1 Literature review
Let us now describe the relevant literature briefly. A large literature on scoring rules ad-
dresses the problem of eliciting beliefs on observable events. See Gneiting and Raftery
(2007) for a discussion of this literature. Recent surveys by Schotter and Trevino (2014)
and Schlag, Tremewan, and van der Weele (2015) provide superb accounts of theoreti-
cal and practical issues with procedures used in experiments to elicit subjective beliefs.
The literature is unrelated to our belief-elicitation procedure since we elicit unobservable
belief-states and beliefs on such states.
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The literature on eliciting beliefs of agents who have non-standard preferences is rela-
tively small. Chambers (2008) studies belief-elicitation of agents with maxmin expected
utility preference using proper scoring rules. The main result is that the agent announces
a single probability belonging to her set of priors. Bose and Daripa (2016) address the
problem of belief-elicitation under the more general α-maxmin preferences, and, in con-
trast to the above, elicit the entire set of beliefs aswell as the relevant preference parameter
for α-maxmin (elicitation of the entire set of beliefs under maxmin is a special case).
The papers mentioned above do not face the question of eliciting beliefs over unobserv-
able states. This question does arise in Karni (2016), who considers elicitation of beliefs
of decision makers who have non-standard preferences but different from the one we
focus on.5 In Karni’s work, the agent faces a multi-stage environment. The agent faces
Knightian uncertainty in period 0, but is an SEU maximizer in period 1 when this uncer-
tainty is resolved.6 The mechanism elicits the beliefs in period 0 by allowing the choice
between acts and lotteries to be delayed to period 1, allowing SEU payoff comparisons
across choices. The fact that agents are SEU when making a decision is crucial for elic-
itation of beliefs in this work. In contrast, we have the more standard problem where
the agent is sensitive to ambiguity, and must make choices while facing ambiguity. For
this problem, the procedure in Karni (2016) cannot be applied, and our methods are quite
different.
To summarise, all existing belief-elicitation procedures depend on observability of the
belief-relevant event and/or agents being SEUmaximizers for making choices. The prob-
lem we study is a departure from this, and we present novel belief-elicitation methods to
address it.
2 Preliminaries
We are interested in eliciting the agent’s beliefs regarding an event E.
Let a finite non-singleton set of probabilities represent the agent’s (first-order) beliefs about
5See also Karni (2017).
6Either the agent has incomplete preferences (a` la Bewley (2002)) in period 0 and beliefs are determined
in period 1, or the agent is a Bayesian decision maker who in period 0 entertains the possibility of a range
of possible posteriors for period 1 with a prior in period 0 over (information signals corresponding to) the
set of the posteriors. In either case, the agent is an SEU maximizer (with a unique prior) in period 1.
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E. The agent’s beliefs involve a second-order belief which is a probability distribution on
the first-order beliefs. Any probability in the support of the second-order belief is called
a belief-state.
Let the agent’s belief be denoted by B ≡ ((µ1, f1), . . . , (µm, fm))where (µ1, . . . , µm) are the
belief-states, µi ∈ [0, 1] and µi 6= µj for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Further, ( f1, . . . , fm) are the
second-order beliefs, where fi > 0 is the belief associated with the state µi, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
and ∑i fi = 1.
The task is to elicit B, i.e. elicit both the belief-states and the second-order belief attached
to each state. We use direct revelation mechanisms for this task and “elicit X” means the
agent’s unique best response is to truthfully report X when facing the mechanism.
We consider eliciting beliefs of an agent with preference represented by the KMM model
of smooth ambiguity. Consider an act x̂Eŷwhich pays a monetary amount x̂ if E happens,
and an amount ŷ otherwise. An agent with KMM preference evaluates this according to
m
∑
i=1
φ(µiu(x̂) + (1− µi)u(ŷ)) fi
where φ is an increasing function and u is the vN-M utility function.
Expressing the payoffs using vN-M numbers simplifies our presentation. Of course the
agent’s vN-M utility function u(·) may be unknown to the mechanism designer but there
are known mechanisms for eliciting agent’s risk preference and for the sake of complete-
ness, we discuss in the next section a mechanism to elicit the vN-M utility function u. The
agent’s risk preference (as represented by the function u(·) ) plays no role in our analysis
and our mechanisms for belief elicitation would work irrespective of the risk attitude of
the agent.
2.1 Eliciting the vN-M utility function
The agent’s risk preference is reflected in the vN-M utility function u(·). This function can
be elicited using a mechanism similar to the well-known scheme of Becker et al. (1964).
Appendix A.1 describes the mechanism to elicit u(·)7. Since u(·) can be elicited and does
not play any other role in the analysis, we reduce notation by adopting the convention
7More precisely, the agent has preference over risky alternatives with u(·) being a numerical represen-
tation; any affine transformation of u(·) is also a representation. Our use of the phrase “elicit u(·)” is really
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that all prizes for objective lotteries or ambiguous acts are vN-M utility numbers rather
than money prizes. So, for example, if the money prize is x̂, we write the prize as x =
u(x̂).
In common with most of the literature, we assume that all departures from expected util-
ity is due to ambiguity aversion. In particular, this means that for all types of ambiguity-
averse preferences, the agent’s payoffs from objective compound lotteries is exactly the same
as an expected utility maximizer’s with same risk preferences.
2.2 Notation
In what follows, x, y, z etc denote vN-M numbers generated using u(·) from monetary
payoffs. We assume the agent strictly prefers more money; in other words, if the money
prize x̂ generating vN-M utility x is strictly higher than the money prize ŷ generating
vN-M utility y, it follows that x > y.
xEy denotes the (subjective) act that pays x if event E happens and y if event E does not
happen (i.e. event E-complement happens). An agent with KMM preference evaluates
this according to
φ ◦ B =
m
∑
i=1
φ(µix+ (1− µi)y) fi
As noted before, using vN-M payoff numbers simplifies the presentation. We sometimes
use the phrase KMM EU to refer to φ ◦ B.
3 Belief elicitation: an outline
This section provides an informal outline of our belief elicitation procedure. For subsec-
tions 3.1 and 3.2 we assume that the function φ is known to the mechanism designer.
First, consider a simpler case when the set of belief states are known. Of course this
would not be true for most situations. Nevertheless, we consider this case since (i) in
a short form for saying elicit any member of this equivalence class of numerical representations. Put dif-
ferently, by the phrase “a mechanism elicits u” we mean the agent’s unique best response when facing this
mechanism is to report a function such that the certainty equivalent of any lottery calculated by using this
reported function is the same as the agent’s true certainty equivalent of the lottery.
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some situations the beliefs states may be known and it would be useful to describe the
(simpler) mechanism that can be used in such cases, and (ii) more importantly, discussing
this case allows us to explain better the complexities that arise when the mechanism has
to elicit both the support (i.e. belief states) and the distribution of second order beliefs.
3.1 A simpler case: set of belief-states known
Here we elicit second-order beliefs F = ( f1, . . . , fm)
′ under the assumption that the set of
belief-states (µ1, . . . , µm) is known to the mechanism designer. Suppose the agent reports
F̂ = ( f̂1, . . . , f̂m)
′. Using a simple Vickrey scheme, it is easy to elicit (as unique best
response) the certainty equivalent (CE) of KMM EU from the act xEy.
8 Using this, we can
back out F by creating enough acts as follows.
The agent is asked to report F and reports F̂. The mechanism designer announces m
prize vectors (xi, yi), i ∈ {i, . . . ,m} and chooses one prize vector randomly, calculates the
associated report of CE, and runs the CE-elicitation scheme (see footnote 8).
Let H denote the following m×m matrix:
H =

φ(µ1x1 + (1− µ1)y1) . . . φ(µmx1 + (1− µm)y1)
...
...
φ(µ1xm + (1− µ1)ym) . . . φ(µmxm + (1− µm)ym)

Note that H is known to the designer. The agent faces the problem of ensuring that
reported and actual CE coincide for each prize vector, implying HF̂ = HF.
If H has full rank, it is clear that F̂ = F is the only possible solution. So the only question
is whether it is possible to ensure H has full rank. This is in fact a non-trivial question.
However, we answer this question for a very similar matrix (where elements are deriva-
tives of φ and the µ-values are reports) later, and prove that so long as the function φ
has non-zero derivatives of a high enough order, this question can be translated into a
question about the rank of a Vandermonde matrix, which is known to have full rank. A
very similar proof can be used to show that it is indeed possible to construct a full-rank
8The CE is given by φ−1(φ ◦ B). The agent is asked to report the CE, and reports r. The designer draws
a value q randomly (say, using the unform distribution) from [y, x] (recall that x > y) and awards the agent
the act if r > q and the prize q otherwise. It is straightforward to see that the agent’s best response is to
report CE truthfully.
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H. This then completes belief-elicitation if the set of belief-states were known.
3.2 An outline of the elicitation procedure
Unlike the (possibly unrealistic) case above, in the actual procedure we need to elicit the
belief-states as well as the second-order probability weights attached to them. Let us see
why the above procedure no longer works in this case.
Suppose the agent announces n values (n could be different from m, the actual num-
ber of belief-states) (µ̂1, . . . , µ̂n) and corresponding second-order beliefs ( f̂1, . . . , f̂n). The
mechanism designer would then announce n prize vectors, so that H is an n× n matrix.
Since true H is no longer known, the designer can only construct Ĥ based on reported
µ-values. If we now used the same procedure as in section 3.1, the agent would need to
ensure ĤF̂ = HF. The possibility that this equality holds for reported µ and f values that
are not truthful cannot be ruled out.
How canwe force the agent to truthfully reveal both belief-states and second-order weights?
Using prize-variations based on the reports received, we develop a test of the belief re-
port. We explain this test in section 3.3 below. Passing the test for n different prize vectors
requires the agent to ensure two conditions involving announced beliefs and true beliefs.
We then show that so long as Â, the n× n matrix below, spans n dimensions, satisfying
these conditions is impossible if the agent lies in any way: misreports any belief-state(s)
or any second-order probabilities. It follows that truth-telling is uniquely optimal.
Â ≡

φ′(µ̂1x1 + (1− µ̂1)y1) . . . φ
′(µ̂nx1 + (1− µ̂n)y1)
...
...
φ′(µ̂1xn + (1− µ̂1)yn) . . . φ
′(µ̂nxn + (1− µ̂n)yn)
 (3.1)
The remaining question then is whether it is possible to construct the matrix Â to have
full rank. We show this depends on whether the function φ has enough non-vanishing
derivatives. In particular, so long as the first to n-th derivative is non-zero (almost every-
where on the set of possible lotteries), the question can be transformed into one asking
whether the n× n Vandermonde matrix is full rank. From standard results in linear alge-
bra, we know that Vandermonde matrices are indeed full rank, which then implies Â is
full rank.
Since n, the cardinality of the set of belief-states announced by the agent, can be chosen
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by the agent, a sufficient condition for belief elicitation to work is that φ has non-zero
derivatives (almost everywhere) of all orders. In the paper, we assume this property. This
class includes exponential and log functions, power functions such as xt where t < 0 or
t is a positive fraction, functions such as xx, trigonometric functions. Essentially the only
class excluded is polynomials of positive integer degree. For this class, our proof works
only so long as the degree exceeds the cardinality of the announced set of belief-states.
3.3 Prize variation: an introduction
We now explain the idea of creating a test of belief-reports through prize variations. Con-
sider a prize vector (x, y) where x > y and the act xEy. Pick a value of µ from the unit
interval. Call this µc. Consider the following prize variation: increase x and reduce y so
as to keep the agent indifferent at the belief-state µc, i.e. keep µcx+ (1− µc)y the same.
In this case,
dy = −
µc
1− µc
dx.
Would the variation make the agent better or worse off? Note that at all belief-states
µ > µc the agent is better off, while the opposite is true for µ < µc. Suppose µc 6 µ1.
Then for all µ values in the support of the second-order beliefs distribution, the agent is
better off - so he is definitely better off overall. Similarly, the agent would definitely be
worse off if µc > µm. As µc increases, the overall payoff continuously (andmonotonically)
decreases. It follows that there is a unique µ∗c ∈ [µ1, µm] such that if we were to change
x and y to keep the agent indifferent at belief µ∗c , the agent would be overall indifferent
between receiving the variation and not receiving it. Figure 1 plots the change in KMM
EU (of the act xEy) from the variation.
Formally, starting from the KMM EU of the act xEy, the change in KMM EU from the
variation is
m
∑
i=1
φ′(µix+ (1− µi)y)
(
µi + (1− µi)
dy
dx
)
fi.
Using the value of dy/dx from above, the cutoff µ∗c is then given implicitly by equating
the change to 0:
m
∑
i=1
φ′(µix+ (1− µi)y)
(
µi − µ
∗
c
1− µ∗c
)
fi = 0. (3.2)
Before we continue, we remind the reader that the exposition up to this point was done
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µc*
Change in KMM-EU from prize variation  
µc*
^
0
µc
Figure 1: The figure is drawn assuming φ(t) =
1− e−αt
α
and B = ((µ1 = 1/3, f1 = 1/3), (µ2 =
1/2, f2 = 1/3), (µ3 = 2/3, f3 = 1/3)). Suppose B̂ is such that µ̂∗c < µ
∗
c . At any µc between these
two points, the agent’s utility would improve from the variation but he does not get it. Similarly,
if µ̂∗c > µ
∗
c , at any µc in between, the agent would rather not get the variation, but does receive it.
as if the mechanism designer knows the true function φ. Of course that is typically not
the case and our mechanism asks the agent to report both φ and B.
Suppose the agent reports (φ̂, B̂). Above we calculated the “true” cutoff value µ∗c using
(φ, B). Let µ̂∗c be the value of the cutoff calculated from (φ̂, B̂).
Let us show that we can elicit µ∗c , i.e. we can construct a mechanism such if the report
generates a cutoff µ̂∗c 6= µ
∗
c , the report would be suboptimal. This idea – that we can
provide incentives to the agent to maintain the cutoffs generated through variations at
their true values – forms a crucial part of the mechanism to elicit beliefs. Consider the
following scheme.
• Ask the agent to announce φ, B. The agent announces φ̂, B̂. Calculate µ̂∗c .
• Pick a µc randomly (e.g. using a uniform distribution) from (0, 1). If µc 6 µ̂∗c , offer
the variation. Otherwise offer no variation (i.e. simply offer the original act).
Suppose that the agent’s reports are such that µ̂∗c < µ
∗
c . If µc 6 µ̂
∗
c , the agent gets the
variation whether his report leads to cutoff value µ̂∗c or µ
∗
c . If µc > µ
∗
c , the agent gets no
variation in either case. If µ̂∗c < µc 6 µ
∗
c , the agent’s utility improves from the variation,
but he does not get it under the report, while he would get it if his report had led to
the true cutoff value. This can be seen from figure 1. A similar argument shows that any
report leading to µ̂∗c > µ
∗
c is suboptimal. Therefore reporting in such a way that maintains
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µ∗c at the true value is the weakly dominant strategy.
The above shows that by introducing report-dependent variations, we can generate a
cutoff value and create incentives for the agent to ensure that his report leads to the true
cutoff value. If we can now show that only the truthful report on beliefs would lead to
the true cutoff value, we would be done. However, the mechanism as described so far
gives the agent too high a “degree of freedom” - it is perfectly possible for the agent to
misreport φ and/or B in such a way that the calculated cutoff nevertheless coincides with
the true cutoff.
An obvious way to try to fix this problem is to “curtail” the degree of freedom - for ex-
ample the mechanism can try to create incentive such that the agent will always want to
report φ truthfully. This is in fact part of what we do: the actual (grand) mechanism elicits
φ (using a mechanism that does not ask for any report on beliefs). So for eliciting beliefs,
we can assume, without loss of generality, that φ is known. It follows that the mechanism
can use the true function φ in its calculation of the cutoff. This curtails degree of freedom
to an extent, but this is not enough. Even if φ cannot be misreported, the mechanism
with just one single value of cutoff still allows for the possibility that the agent might
misreport beliefs B, yet the calculated cutoff coincides with the true one. To solve this
problem, we need to generate multiple (at least two) cutoffs with the same property that
the agent’s best response is to ensure all report-generated cutoffs are equal to their true
values. With (properly chosen) multiple cutoffs, we can show that the only way to ensure
these equalities is for the agent to report beliefs truthfully.
µ  (g)c*
Change in KMM-EU from prize variation 
µc
0
g
µ  (0)c*
Figure 2: For g = 0, the agent is overall indifferent under Var(x, y) at µc = µ∗c (0). If now
we set g > 0, we get a lower cutoff µ∗c (g).
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How can we generate other cutoffs? If we could introduce a further variation that would
improve the agent’s KMM EU at a rate g that is independent of the agent’s beliefs (true or
reported), we could find a cutoff – call it µ∗c (g) – such that if we were to change x and y to
keep the agent indifferent at belief µ∗c (g), the agent would be overall indifferent between
receiving this (x, y) variation and receiving the belief-independent variation. Since µ∗c (g)
depends on g, by varying g we could find different values for the cutoff. This is shown in
figure 2.
The mechanism we set up in section 5 finds a way to introduce such a belief-independent
variation to compare with the (x, y) variation we introduced before, allowing us to gen-
erate multiple cutoffs. We ensure it is optimal for the agent to maintain all such cutoff
values at their true values. We then show this is only possible if the report is truthful.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4 formally introduces the mech-
anism with prize variations. Section 5 shows that B can be elicited assuming that φ is
known using an augmented form of the mechanism introduced in the previous section.
Next, section 6 sets up a mechanism to extract φ (this does not require any knowledge
of or reports about B). Finally, section 7 constructs a grand mechanism combining the
previously-introduced ones and shows that φ and B can be elicited simultaneously.
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4 A mechanism with prize variations
This section introduces a mechanismwith prize variations and derives certain properties.
We make use of these in later sections to elicit beliefs.
We use the following two acts and prize variations on these acts.
xEy and Var(x, y): Consider a prize vector (x, y) where x > y > 0 and the act xEy. Let
Var(x, y) denote the following prize variation: Pick a value µc ∈ (0, 1), then raise x and
reduce y so as to keep µcx+ (1− µc)y the same. In this case, dy = −
µc
1−µc
dx.
zEz and Var(z): Next, consider a constant act zEz, z > 0. Let Var(z) denote the follow-
ing prize variation: raise z at the same rate as x in the other variation, i.e. dz = dx.
Recall that the agent’s second-order belief is given by B ≡ ((µ1, f1), . . . , (µm, fm)) where
(µ1, . . . , µm) are the belief-states or second-order states, µi ∈ [0, 1] and µi 6= µj for all
i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Further, ( f1, . . . , fm) are the second-order beliefs, where fi > 0 is the
belief associated with the state µi, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and ∑i fi = 1.
Let φ̂ denote the agent’s report on φ and let the belief report be B̂ ≡ {(µ̂1, f̂1), . . . , (µ̂n, f̂n)}
Let µ̂∗c (p) be given by the solution to
p
n
∑
i=1
φ̂′(µ̂ix+ (1− µ̂i)y)
(
µ̂i − µ̂
∗
c (p)
1− µ̂∗c (p)
)
f̂i = (1− p)φ̂
′(z) (4.1)
Let
p ≡
φ̂′(z)
T̂1 + φ̂′(z)
(4.2)
where T̂1 ≡
n
∑
i=1
φ̂′(µ̂ix+ (1− µ̂i)y)µ̂i f̂i. Note that p ∈ (0, 1), so that the interval (p, 1] is
non-empty. It is straightforward to verify that so long as p < p 6 1, there is a unique
solution µ̂∗c (p) ∈ (0, 1).
9
It is worth noting at the outset that in all mechanisms specified, any randomization is
done before the event E is realized.
9Let T̂2 ≡ ∑
n
i=1 φ̂
′(µ̂ix + (1 − µ̂i)y) f̂i. Solving from equation (4.1), µ̂
∗
c (p) = (T̂1 −
1−p
p φ̂
′(z))/(T̂2 −
1−p
p φ̂
′(z)). Since T̂1 < T̂2, µ̂
∗
c (p) < 1. The value of p follows from µ̂
∗
c (p) = 0.
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A mechanism with prize variations
The agent is asked to report B and φ. The agent reports B̂ ≡ {(µ̂1, f̂1), . . . , (µ̂n, f̂n)} and φ̂.
Note that the cardinality of the set of reported belief-states is n. After receiving the report
the mechanism designer follows the procedure below, also depicted in Figure 3.
1. Announce n prize vectors xi, yi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and randomly choose one: (xk, yk).
10
To simplify notation, we will denote the chosen (xk, yk) as (x, y) in the rest of this
section. (Since only one prize vector is chosen there is no scope for confusion if we
drop the subscript.)
2. Choose a p ∈ (p, 1] randomly (e.g. using a uniform distribution). (p is defined by
(4.2).)
3. Choose the act xEy with probability p and the constant act zEz with probability
(1− p).
4. Calculate µ̂∗c (p) (using equation (4.1) above).
5. Next, choose a µc randomly from [0, 1] (e.g. using a uniform distribution). Adjust
the act as follows.
• If and only if (a) µc 6 µ̂
∗
c (p), and (b) xEy is picked in step 3, award the variation
Var(x, y) at µc.
• If and only if (a) µc > µ̂
∗
c (p), and (b) zEz is picked in step 3, award the variation
Var(z).
• In any other case, award no variation - i.e. simply award the original act picked
in step 3.
§
10Each of the prize vectors are chosen from some subset of R2 according to some known distribution;
the prize (xk, yk) is similarly chosen according to some known rule. The exact nature of the subset and the
distribution is unimportant. So, for notational simplicity, we do not explicitly mention the distribution nor
write the agent’s payoff below as expectation with respect to the distribution. What is crucial is that the set
of the n prize vectors as well as the chosen prize vector (xk, yk) are determined according to known rules
that are part of the description of the mechanism - in particular these should not add any additional source
of ambiguity to the choice problem that the agent faces. For belief elicitation, there is one crucial property
that the chosen prizes must satisfy. This is discussed later in section 5.
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Figure 3: The mechanism with prize variations. The expressions at the terminal nodes
show not the level of KMM EU but the change in KMM EU (of the relevant act) arising
from the variations. Note that only the variation received by the agent depends on the
agent’s announcement (through determination of µ∗c (p)).
Let us first calculate the (true) cutoff µ∗c (p) given the mechanism above. For any choice of
p, the agent calculates KMMEU as∑mi=1 φ(µiw1+(1−µi)w2) fi, wherew1 = px+(1− p)z
and w2 = py + (1− p)z. Now suppose the agent is awarded variation Var(x, y). The
agent’s utility should then change as:
m
∑
i=1
φ′(·)p
(
µi + (1− µi)
dy
dx
)
fidx
which can be written as
p
m
∑
i=1
φ′(·)
(
µi − µc
1− µc
)
fidx
using the fact that dy = −
µc
1− µc
dx.
To evaluate φ′(·), the agent conditions on the information that variation Var(x, y) can only
be awarded if xEy is chosen in the first place. Therefore φ
′(·) is evaluated at w1 = x and
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w2 = y. It follows that the rate of change of KMM EU from Var(x, y) is
p
m
∑
i=1
φ′(µix+ (1− µi)y)
(
µi − µc
1− µc
)
fidx. (4.3)
Similarly, if the agent is awarded variation Var(z), utility changes as: ∑mi=1 φ
′(·)(1− p) fidz
where φ′(·) is evaluated at w1 = z and w2 = z since the agent conditions on the informa-
tion that this variation can be awarded only if initially zEz was chosen. Thus the rate of
change of KMM EU from Var(z) is given by ∑mi=1 φ
′(z)(1− p) fidz which simplifies to
(1− p)φ′(z)dz. (4.4)
From expressions (4.3) and (4.4), and using dz = dx, it follows that µ∗c (p) is given implic-
itly by
p
m
∑
i=1
φ′(µix+ (1− µi)y)
(
µi − µ
∗
c (p)
1− µ∗c (p)
)
fi = (1− p)φ
′(z). (4.5)
Note that when calculating µ̂∗c from the agent’s report, we have used equation (4.1), which
is the same equation but uses φ̂ and B̂ - the reported values for φ and beliefs.
We are now ready to present the first important result. This shows that the agent does not
want the cutoff µ̂∗c (p) calculated from his report to be different from the true cutoff.
Theorem 1. Under the mechanism with prize variations stated above, if the cutoff µ̂∗c (p) (derived
using the report (φ̂, B̂)) differs from the “true” value µ∗c (p) (derived using the true (φ, B)) for
any p ∈ (p, 1], the report is suboptimal.
While the formal proof is in the appendix, the discussion in section 3.3 explains the idea
of the proof, which relies on a Vickrey-type dominance argument. Further, note that
the act received by the agent does not depend on the agent’s report. The report only
influences the calculation of the cutoff µ̂∗c (p) (and therefore only influences the variation
received by the agent). This, combined with the theorem above, shows that any report
that preserves the cutoffs at their true value is an optimal report. It follows that truth-
telling is an optimal strategy. In other words, the agent cannot do better than telling the
truth by lying, and is at best indifferent between reporting truthfully or lying. We note
this in the following corollary, which is useful for later arguments.
Corollary 1. Under the mechanism with prize variations, truth-telling is a best response. In
other words, any agent who submits a report (φ̂, B̂) where either φ̂ 6= φ and/or B̂ 6= B, must be
indifferent between submitting this and submitting (φ, B).
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5 Eliciting Beliefs
Corollary 1 above says that truth-telling is an optimal strategy. We now proceed to show
that if we assume φ is known, then under the mechanism with prize variations presented
in the previous section augmented by an additional property, reporting B truthfully is the
uniquely optimal strategy. Later we elicit φ, and then construct a grand mechanism that
elicits B and φ simultaneously.
Before we state the main result of this section on eliciting B, we need to introduce an
assumption about the function φ. In constructing the proof, it is crucial that the n × n
matrix Â (given by (3.1)), can be constructed to be of full rank by choosing the n prize
vectors appropriately. We show next that a sufficient condition for Â to have full rank
is that the function φ has non-zero derivatives (almost everywhere) of order at least n.
Since the agent can report any number of belief-states, a sufficient condition is that φ has
non-zero derivatives of all orders almost everywhere. We assume this:
Assumption 1. The function φ(·) has non-zero derivatives of all orders almost everywhere on its
domain (set of all possible expected utilities from the set of lottery prize vectors).
We assume that any report φ̂(·) has the same property.11
Note that this class includes exponential and log functions, power functions such as xt
where t < 0 or t is a positive fraction, functions such as xx, trigonometric functions.
Essentially the only class excluded is polynomials of positive integer degree. For this
latter class, our proof works only so long as the degree exceeds the cardinality of the
announced set of belief-states.
Theorem 2. Under assumption 1, it is possible to construct the matrix Â to have full rank for
any finite n.
The proof shows that the question can be translated into one about the rank of a Vander-
monde matrix and then using its properties. We relegate this to the appendix. For the
matrix Â to have full rank, the set of n prize vectors (xi, yi) have to be chosen in a certain
way (see also footnote 10). One procedure is as follows. For any ε > 0, small, let X denote
11Alternatively, if a report φ̂ does not have the property, the seller would withdraw from participation,
leaving the agent with a zero payoff. By construction, the worst (realized) payoff that the agent can receive
by participating in the mechanism is strictly positive.
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the set [ε, 1]× [ε, 1]. The first prize vector (x1, y1) is chosen from X randomly (for example
according to the uniform distribution). By definition, the smaller of the two number is
called y1 (if the vector happens to be from the 45 degree line, it is discarded and a new
vector is chosen). Let M(k) denote the k× k square sub-matrix formed by the first k rows
and first k columns of Â. The vector (x1, y1) determines the first row of Â. Given (x1, y1)
(and the agent’s belief report) calculate X2 ⊂ X such that if the second row of Â is con-
structed by using any vector from X2 then M(2) has rank 2, implying Â has rank at least
2. The proof shows this set is non-empty. The prize vector (x2, y2) is chosen randomly
(according to conditional uniform) from X2. Similarly, (x3, y3) is chosen to ensure M(3)
has rank 3 and this process is continued till all the n prize vectors are chosen such that the
constructed matrix Â has full rank.
Consider the following mechanism.
ΓB: A mechanism to elicit belief states and second-order beliefs B
This is the same as the mechanism with prize variations outlined in the previous section
with the following augmentation: in step 1, the mechanism designer chooses the n prize
vectors to ensure that the matrix Â has full rank (we know this is possible from Theorem 2
above).
§
We now state the main belief-elicitation result.
Theorem 3. Suppose φ is known, and assumption 1 holds. Then under the mechanism ΓB, the
agent’s unique best response is to report B truthfully, i.e. to report truthfully the belief states and
the second-order belief attached to each state.
The idea of the proof is as follows: suppose we calculate µ̂∗c (p) using φ (the true func-
tion) and B̂ (the reported beliefs). Using Theorem 1 above, we know optimality requires
µ̂∗c (p) = µ
∗
c (p). Using this condition, we derive two matrix equality conditions involving
B and B̂. We then show these can only be satisfied if B̂ = B.
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5.1 Proof of Theorem 3
5.1.1 Step 1
We know from Theorem 1 that any optimal report must ensure µ̂∗c (p) = µ
∗
c (p) for any
p ∈ (p, 1]. Using this, and φ̂ = φ (since we assume φ is known) in equation (4.1) and
rewriting (4.5), we get the following:
n
∑
i=1
φ′(µ̂ix+ (1− µ̂i)y) (µ̂i − µ
∗
c (p)) f̂i =
(
1− p
p
)
(1− µ∗c (p))φ
′(z)
m
∑
i=1
φ′(µix+ (1− µi)y) (µi − µ
∗
c (p)) fi =
(
1− p
p
)
(1− µ∗c (p))φ
′(z)
Since the right hand sides are equal, we can equate the left hand sides:
n
∑
i=1
φ′(µ̂ix+ (1− µ̂i)y)µ̂i f̂i − µ
∗
c (p)
n
∑
i=1
φ′(µ̂ix+ (1− µ̂i)y) f̂i
=
m
∑
i=1
φ′(µix+ (1− µi)y)µi fi − µ
∗
c (p)
m
∑
i=1
φ′(µix+ (1− µi)y) fi
Now, recall that the mechanism designer announces n prize vectors xi, yi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
and randomly chooses one: (xk, yk). The above equation must be satisfied for any choice
of (xk, yk), so we get n conditions, which we can write in matrix notation as follows.
Let A be the following n×m matrix.
A ≡

φ′(µ1x1 + (1− µ1)y1) . . . φ
′(µmx1 + (1− µm)y1)
...
...
φ′(µ1xn + (1− µ1)yn) . . . φ
′(µmxn + (1− µm)yn)

Â is as defined by (3.1). Next, let M be an m×m diagonal matrix of belief-states:
M ≡

µ1 0 . . . 0
0 µ2 . . . 0
...
...
...
0 0 . . . µm

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Let M̂ be the similar n × n diagonal matrix of reported belief-states. Next, let F denote
the m× 1 vector of second-order beliefs
F ≡

f1
...
fm

and similarly define F̂ as the n × 1 vector of reported second-order beliefs. Finally, let
µ∗c (p)k denote the cutoff value for the k-th prize vector (xk, yk), k = 1, . . . , n. Let Cp be the
following n× n diagonal matrix of cutoff values:
Cp ≡

µ∗c (p)1 0 . . . 0
0 µ∗c (p)2 . . . 0
...
...
...
0 0 . . . µ∗c (p)n

The n conditions above can now be written as
Â M̂ F̂− Cp Â F̂ = AM F− Cp A F
Rewriting,
Â M̂ F̂− AM F = Cp
(
Â F̂− A F
)
.
Note that the only term that involves p is Cp. Further, for any prize vector (x, y), the
corresponding cutoff µ∗c (p) changes with p.
12 Thus every diagonal element in Cp changes
with p. It follows that the right hand side varies with p. Therefore the above equality can
hold only if
Â F̂ = A F. (5.1)
This also implies
Â M̂ F̂ = AM F.
Solving for F̂ from each equation and setting them equal we have
Â−1 AF = M̂−1 Â−1AMF.
12This is intuitively obvious: as p rises, we are raising the value of variation Var(x, y), so µ∗c (p) should
rise with p. This can be seen formally by solving for µ∗c (p) and taking the derivative. Let T1 ≡ ∑
m
i=1 φ
′(µix+
(1− µi)y)µi fi and T2 ≡ ∑
m
i=1 φ
′(µix + (1− µi)y) fi. Note that T1 < T2. Then, solving from equation (4.5)
and differentiating,
∂µ∗c
∂p =
φ′(z)(T2−T1)
(T2p−(1−p)φ′(z))2
> 0.
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which implies that
Â−1A = M̂−1 Â−1AM. (5.2)
This proves the following result.
Lemma 1. Any report B̂ ≡ {(µ̂1, f̂1), . . . , (µ̂n, f̂n)} that does not satisfy equation (5.2) fails to
satisfy µ∗c (p) = µ̂
∗
c (p).
5.1.2 Step 2
Lemma 1 above, combined with theorem 1, implies that any report not satisfying equa-
tion (5.2) is suboptimal. The proof now proceeds to show that it is not possible to satisfy
equation (5.2) unless F̂ = F and M̂ = M, implying that truthtelling is uniquely optimal.
Step 2.1 First, let us show that we cannot have n 6= m. We consider the two cases, n > m
and n < m, separately.
To clarify the idea behind the proof, here we use two simple examples for the two cases
below. The general proof of step 2.1 – which uses the same logic but is perhaps less
transparent – is in the appendix (section A.4).
Case A: n > m Suppose the agent has a unique prior µ1, but reports 2 priors µ̂1 with
weight f̂1 and µ̂2 with weight f̂2, where f̂i > 0 and ∑i f̂i = 1.
Let zij denote a typical element of the matrix Â
−1A. Since the matrix is n× m, we have
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Applied to this case, equation (5.2) implies
(
z11
z21
)
=

µ1
µ̂1
z11
µ1
µ̂2
z21
 (5.3)
Now, recall that F̂ = Â−1AF. Here F is simply 1, so(
f̂1
f̂2
)
=
(
z11
z21
)
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Since f̂i > 0, both z11 and z21 must be positive. But then equation (5.3) cannot possibly
hold, since µ1 cannot be equal to both µ̂1 and µ̂2.
In the general case of m values and n > m reports, exactly the same problem emerges. All
n rows of Â−1A must contain positive elements. This then implies that for equation (5.2)
to hold, some µ values would need to be equal to more than one µ̂ value, which is impos-
sible.
Case B: n < m
Consider an example where the agent reports two belief states µ̂1 and µ̂2 (with positive
weights f̂1 and f̂2, respectively), while the agent has 4 belief states µi, i ∈ {1, . . . , 4} with
second-order beliefs fi. In this case, equation (5.2) implies
(
z11 z12 z13 z14
z21 z22 z23 z24
)
=

µ1
µ̂1
z11
µ2
µ̂1
z12
µ3
µ̂1
z13
µ4
µ̂1
z14
µ1
µ̂2
z21
µ2
µ̂2
z22
µ3
µ̂2
z23
µ4
µ̂2
z24

First, note that µ̂i must be equal to some µj. Otherwise, it is impossible to have zij =
µj
µ̂i
zij
for any choice of i, j where i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {1, . . . , 4}. Suppose, in this case,
µ̂1 = µ2 and µ̂2 = µ4.
Then Â is the matrix formed by columns 2 and 4 of A. It follows that the second column of
Â−1A is the vector (1, 0)′ and the fourth column is the vector (0, 1)′ (these can be verified
by direct calculation, but the idea should be obvious). In other words, the matrix formed
by columns 2 and 4 of Â−1A is the 2× 2 identity matrix.
Thus, equation (5.2) implies
(
z11 1 z13 0
z21 0 z23 1
)
=

µ1
µ̂1
z11 1
µ3
µ̂1
z13 0
µ1
µ̂2
z21 0
µ3
µ̂2
z23 1

Clearly, this is possible only if all zij terms in columns 1 and 3 of Â
−1A are 0, so we would
have
Â−1A = M̂−1Â−1AM =
(
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
)
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But F̂ = Â−1AF. Therefore, f̂1
f̂2
 = ( 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
)
f1
...
f4

But that implies f̂1 = f2 and f̂2 = f4. This is impossible since then ∑ f̂i = f2 + f4 < 1.
The proof extends immediately to the general case of n < m.
Step 2.2 From step 2.1 above, it follows that wemust have n = m. In this case, zij =
µj
µ̂i
zij
requires each µ̂i to be equal to a distinct µj. Since n = m, the reported vector must coincide
with the true vector. In other words, we have M̂ = M. But then Â = A. Therefore, Â−1A
is the m×m identity matrix, and F̂ = Â−1AF = F. This completes the proof.‖
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6 Eliciting φ
So far we have described the belief elicitation mechanism under the assumption that the
function φ is known. However, this would be a fairly unrealistic assumption for most
situations and we now discuss the mechanism that elicits φ. This should be of some
independent interest as well (for example for policy making purposes where the policy
maker may need to know φ.)
We first describe the construction of an ambiguous act and a (random) second-order act,
which play crucial roles in the mechanism that elicits φ.
Ambiguous Act: For prizes x > y, consider a lottery that pays x with probability p (and
hence y with probability 1− p) and it is announced that p is chosen from a non-singleton
set P . We can assume, without loss of generality, that P has two elements, p1 and p2. No
further information as to how p is chosen from the setP is provided. The lottery therefore
constitutes an ambiguous act13 and letting H denote the agent’s second-order belief over
P , the agent’s KMM EU is φ ◦ H. With a slight abuse of notation, we use H to represent
the agent’s (second-order ) belief that p = p1; hence the number 1− H represents the
belief that p = p2.
Second-Order Act (SOA): For some prizes w > z, the second-order act pays w if p is cho-
sen to be p1 and z if the chosen p is equal to p2. A Random SOA (RSOA), chooses w and
z independently according to some announced distribution. For example, two numbers
are drawn independently from the uniform distribution over [0, 1] with the larger of the
two called w. Once w and z have been chosen, the rest of RSOA is then exactly as in SOA.
Objective Lottery: For q ∈ [0, 1], let ℓ(q;w, z) denote the objective lottery that pays w
with probability q and z with probability 1− q.
13The actual, physical construction of the ambiguous act can be done following techniques well-known in
the literature and used in laboratory experiments. For example, a two coloured urn is constructed, consisting
of red and white balls of unknown proportion and the act pays x if the colour of the ball drawn from the
urn is red and pays y if the colour is white. It is announced that the proportion of red andwhite balls is such
that the probability of drawing a red ball is either p1 or p2 but no further information is given regarding
the probability of choosing p1 or p2. There are well-known practices followed in laboratory experiments
to make the process clear and credible to the experiment subjects and we assume some such method is
employed.
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Γφ: A mechanism for eliciting φ14
The agent is asked to report φ and H. Let φ̂ and Ĥ denote the corresponding reports.
1. The mechanism chooses prizes w, z as in RSOA.
2. With (objective) probability 1/2 each, the mechanism selects either scheme A or
scheme B.
• Under Scheme A, the mechanism chooses a number q randomly according to
the uniform distribution over [0, 1].
– If q ≥ Ĥ the agent is given the objective lottery ℓ(q;w, z).
– If q < Ĥ, the agent is awarded the SOA with prizes w and z.
• Under Scheme B, the mechanism chooses a number randomly from the uni-
form distribution over [z,w]. Call the randomly chosen number t. The mecha-
nism calculates, according to the reports of the agent, the certainty equivalent
(recall this is in terms of vN-M utils, not money) of the ambiguous act with
prizes w and z. That is, the mechanism calculates the certainty equivalent of
Ĥ φ̂
(
p1w+ (1− p1)z
)
+
(
1− Ĥ
)
φ̂
(
p2w+ (1− p2)z
)
. Let ĈE denote this calcu-
lated certainty equivalent.15 The mechanism allocates as follows.
– If t ≥ ĈE, the agent is awarded the prize t.
– If t < ĈE, the agent is awarded the ambiguous act.
§
We now show why this mechanism elicits φ. Consider first scheme B. Let CE be the
agent’s true certainty equivalent. It is easy to see (using the standard weak-dominance
argument) that the agent’s best response is to submit Ĥ and φ̂ such that the calculated
certainty equivalent ĈE is equal to CE. Clearly, truthful reporting is a best response; how-
ever, it may not be the unique best response. On the other hand if scheme A is chosen
14The usual caveats apply. The mechanism elicits a function that is a representation of the agent’s pref-
erence over second-order acts. If the agent reports an affine transformation of this function then that obvi-
ously is also a truthful elicitation (See KMM).
15This is given by φ̂−1
(
Ĥ φ̂(p1w+ (1− p1)z) + (1− Ĥ) φ̂(p2w+ (1− p2)z)
)
.
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(which happens with strictly positive probability), the reported φ̂ is irrelevant and report-
ing Ĥ to be the same as the true H is the unique best response. (Scheme A is essentially
the mechanism in Karni (2009) and its chief advantage is that it elicits beliefs while al-
lowing for the mechanism to remain agnostic about φ.) Given that the agent reports H
truthfully, reporting φ̂ = φ is then the unique best response under scheme B. To see this,
note that if, say, φ̂(·) > φ(·) at any point in the domain of prizes, by continuity there
must be an open interval in the domain on which φ̂(·) > φ(·). But then with positive
probability piw+ (1− pi)z belongs to this interval for i ∈ {1, 2}, implying that ĈE 6= CE.
Similarly, we can rule out having φ̂(·) < φ(·) at any point in the domain of prizes. This
proves the following result.
Theorem 4. Under the mechanism Γφ, the agent’s unique best response is to report φ truthfully.
It might be useful to compare Γφ - the mechanism to elicit ambiguity-preference - with
procedures that elicit risk-preference u(·) (see appendix A.1 for one such procedure). Elic-
itation of risk-preference involves use of constructed/engineered objective lotteries and
of calculated (monetary) certainty equivalent of the lotteries using reports submitted by
the agent. As one would expect, a constructed/engineered ambiguous act - and the cal-
culated certainty equivalent of this act based on the agent’s report - is used in Γφ. There is
however an important and subtle difference. The certainty equivalent of a risky prospect
does not depend on whether the prospect is subjective or objective. But φ(·), which re-
flects the agent’s ambiguity-preference, comes into play only if the act is subjective. Fur-
thermore, the associated second-order belief H – without the knowledge of which the
certainty equivalent of the ambiguous act cannot be calculated by the mechanism – is
the agent’s private information. This explains the need for scheme A. Its sole purpose
is to elicit the second-order belief H which can then be used for calculating the certainty
equivalent used in scheme B.
7 A grand mechanism to elicit B and φ concurrently
We have so far constructed the mechanism ΓB in section 5 to elicit B assuming φ is known
and Γφ in section 6 to elicit φ (the latter does not require any knowledge of B). In this
section we use these to construct a grand mechanism to elicit B and φ together.
The grandmechanism is a straightforward combination of the twomechanisms discussed
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so far:
Γ: A grand mechanism to elicit B and φ concurrently
Ask the agent to report B and φ. The agent reports B̂ and φ̂. Using these as the relevant
reported values, run
• the mechanism ΓB with probability 1/2, and
• the mechanism Γφ with probability 1/2.
§
Corollary 1 shows that under the mechanismwith prize variations introduced in section 4
– and therefore also undermechanism ΓB – reporting both φ and B truthfully is an optimal
strategy. It follows that at worst the agent is indifferent between lying and telling the
truth.
Next, under mechanism Γφ, reporting φ truthfully is uniquely optimal (Theorem 4). Also
note that this mechanism does not seek reports on B. Since mechanism Γφ is offered with
positive probability, truthful report of φ is uniquely optimal.
It follows that we need to only consider reports of the type (φ, B̂), and then rule out B̂ 6= B.
This is accomplished by Theorem 3, which shows that if φ is known and assumption 1
holds, reporting B truthfully is uniquely optimal undermechanism ΓB. Since ΓB is offered
with positive probability, reporting B truthfully is uniquely optimal.
It follows that under the grand mechanism Γ, it is uniquely optimal to report both φ and
B truthfully. This proves the result below.
Theorem 5. Suppose assumption 1 holds. Under the grand mechanism Γ above, the uniquely
optimal response of the agent is to report B and φ truthfully.
8 Conclusion
We study elicitation of subjective beliefs of an agent facing model uncertainty or ambigu-
ity. The agent has non-singleton (first-order) priors on an event. Each prior (belief-state)
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refers to a different underlying data generating process and the corresponding probabil-
ity model. The agent then has a second-order prior on these first-order belief-states. The
agent’s preference exhibits non-neutrality to the second-order distribution. As discussed
at the outset, such a two-stage decomposition of uncertainty and non-reduction of com-
pound lotteries resulting from non-neutrality to the second-order distribution plays an
important role in the literature in resolving the Ellsberg Paradox.
The large belief-elicitation literature focuses on eliciting beliefs on events that are observ-
able. The entire scoring rule literature fits into this category. Here, on the other hand,
we elicit (second-order) beliefs on unobservable belief-states. A few recent papers do
also address problems pertaining to belief-elicitation on unobservable states, but these
require the agent to be SEU maximizer at some decision making stage. In this paper, in
contrast, we consider the more standard problem of eliciting first and second-order be-
liefs of agents who are ambiguity-sensitive and do in fact face ambiguity when making
a decision. Here we adopt the smooth ambiguity representation of KMM for specificity.
However, as discussed, several other axiomatisations result in a similar representation
structure.
The literature on belief elicitation on observable states compares levels of utility from acts
and lotteries. Here, with unobservable states and ambiguity-sensitive agents, we show
that we need to consider how utility changes under report-dependent prize variations.
Using such variations, we construct a novel direct revelation mechanism that induces
truthful reporting of the first-order belief states as well as the second-order distribution
on the belief-states as the unique best response. The mechanism requires knowledge of
the sensitivity function to second-order distribution (capturing ambiguity attitude) and
the vN-M utility function. We construct variations on established techniques to elicit
these aspects of the agent’s preferences.
While we consider a smooth ambiguity representation to elicit second-order beliefs, our
idea of using report-dependant prize-variations is quite general, and should be applicable
for eliciting beliefs on unobservable states more broadly.
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A Appendix
A.1 Eliciting u(·)
For x > y, where x and y are inmonetary units, consider the objective lottery ℓ(p; x, y) that
awards x with probability p and y with probability (1− p). A mechanism that elicits u(·)
is as follows. (See footnote 7.)
• The agent is asked to report u. Let û denote the report.
• The mechanism selects two numbers (call the larger of them x and the smaller one
y) randomly from some interval according to independent draws. Without loss of
generality let the interval be [0, 1]with the random selections made according to the
uniform distribution.
• The mechanism calculates the expected utility of ℓ(p; x, y) using reported function
û. Let V̂ denote the certainty equivalent.
• Next, the mechanism picks a number r randomly - for example using the uniform
distribution - from the set [y, x]. If r > V̂, the agent is awarded the certain amount
r. If r 6 V̂, the agent receives the lottery ℓ(p; x, y).
Let us show that this mechanism elicits u. Let V denote the true certainty equivalent
of ℓ(p; x, y). Suppose V̂ > V. The misreporting is irrelevant if r > V̂ or r < V. If
V̂ > r > V, the report of û earns u(V) while the true report earns u(r), which is higher.
Similar arguments show that truthful reporting is weakly dominant if V > V̂. Therefore
reporting u such that V̂ = V is the weakly dominant strategy under themechanism. Now,
if, say, û(·) > u(·) at any point in the domain of prizes, by continuity there must be an
open interval in the domain on which û(·) > u(·). But then with positive probability
V̂ 6= V. It follows that reporting u(·) truthfully is optimal.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Recall that µ∗c (we drop the argument p here as it plays no role in this proof - the argu-
ments are valid for any p ∈ (p, 1]) is given by equation (4.5). The expression on the left
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hand side is the change in KMM EU from variation Var(x, y) and that on the right hand
side is the change in KMM EU from variation Var(z). The cutoff µ∗c is such that the two
are equal. Note that the change from Var(x, y) is preferred for µc < µ
∗
c and that from
Var(x, y) is preferred for µc > µ∗c .
Case 1. Suppose µ̂∗c < µ
∗
c .
If the µc chosen is such that µc < µ̂
∗
c , reporting (φ, B) or (φ̂, B̂) does not make any dif-
ference - in either case, the agent receives the change in KMM EU from prize variation
Var(x, y) at µc. If µc > µ∗c , in either case the agent receives the change from Var(z). Fi-
nally, suppose µc is such that µ̂
∗
c < µc < µ
∗
c . Then under a truthful report the agent
receives the change in KMM EU from Var(x, y) at µc and under the false report, the agent
receives the change from Var(z). But in this case, the change in KMM EU is higher from
Var(x, y).
It follows that reporting (φ̂, B̂) under which µ̂∗c = µ
∗
c weakly dominates reporting some
other (φ̂, B̂) under which µ̂∗c < µ
∗
c .
Case 2. Suppose µ∗c < µ̂
∗
c .
If µc > µ̂
∗
c or µc < µ
∗
c , whether the report is true or false makes no difference to the agent’s
payoff. Finally, suppose µ∗c < µc < µ̂
∗
c . Then under the truthful report the agent receives
the change in KMM EU from Var(z), while under the false report the agent receives the
change from Var(x, y) at µc. However, in this case the agent prefers the change in KMM
EU from Var(z).
It follows that reporting (φ̂, B̂) under which µ̂∗c = µ
∗
c weakly dominates reporting some
other (φ̂, B̂) under which µ∗c < µ̂
∗
c .
The two cases above imply that reporting (φ̂, B̂) under which µ̂∗c = µ
∗
c is the weakly dom-
inant strategy. Since, under any report that leads to µ̂∗c 6= µ
∗
c , there is a strictly positive
probability that the choice of µc is such that the agent gets the lower change in KMM EU,
reporting (φ̂, B̂) under which µ̂∗c 6= µ
∗
c is suboptimal.‖
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A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
We show here that under assumption 1, it is possible to find prize vectors (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)
such that Â (given by equation (3.1)) has full rank.
In what follows, all µ-values are reports (i.e. they all have a “hat” on top). Since there
is no possibility of confusion, for economy of notation, we remove all “hat” symbols in
the proof that follows. Further, since we need to repeatedly use expressions of the form
φ′(µ̂ixk + (1− µ̂i)yk), we shorten it to φ
′(µi, xk, yk) (again, note that we are also removing
the hat on µi).
With these notation changes, the matrix Â in equation (3.1) is now written as
A =

φ′(µ1, x1, y1) . . . φ
′(µn, x1, y1)
...
...
...
φ′(µ1, xn, yn) . . . φ
′(µn, xn, yn)

We need to construct A to have full rank n.
Let M(k) be the following k× k minor of A, where 2 6 k 6 n.
M(k) =

φ′(µ1, x1, y1) φ
′(µ2, x1, y1) . . . φ
′(µk, x1, y1)
φ′(µ1, x2, y2) φ
′(µ2, x2, y2) . . . φ
′(µk, x2, y2)
...
... . . .
...
φ′(µ1, xk, yk) φ
′(µ2, xk, yk) . . . φ
′(µk, xk, yk)

Note that a sufficient condition for the rank of A to be at least k is that M(k) is full rank.
To show that it is possible to construct A so that it has full rank n, we use a proof by
induction. Let R(X) denote the rank of matrix X. We show that for k = 2, the minor M(2)
has full rank, establishing that R(A) > 2. We then show that if M(k − 1) has full rank,
then we can construct M(k) so that the latter has full rank k, for any k ∈ {3, . . . , n}. In
other words, R(A) > k − 1 implies R(A) > k. Since M(2) has rank 2, this shows that
M(3) . . .M(n) can be constructed to have full rank. But M(n) is simply the matrix A,
which proves that R(A) = n.
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A.3.1 Step 1: M(2) has full rank
We first show that M(2) can be constructed to have rank 2.
Suppose not. Suppose for all possible choices of (x2, y2), M(2) has rank 1.
It follows that there are numbers β1 and β2 not both zero such that(
φ′(µ1, x1, y1) φ
′(µ2, x1, y1)
φ′(µ1, x2, y2) φ
′(µ2, x2, y2)
)(
β1
β2
)
=
(
0
0
)
Since
β1φ
′(µ1, x2, y2) + β2φ
′(µ2, x2, y2) = 0 (A.1)
for all possible choices of x2, y2, it follows that a necessary condition for equation (A.1) to
hold is that the derivative of the expression on the left hand side with respect to x2 must
also be zero:
β1µ1φ
′′(µ1, x2, y2) + β2µ2φ
′′(µ2, x2, y2) = 0. (A.2)
Further, suppose β1 + β2 6= 0. We can write equation (A.1) as
β1
(
φ′(µ1, x2, y2)− φ
′(µ2, x2, y2)
)
= −(β1 + β2)φ
′(µ2, x2, y2).
But then by choosing y2 arbitrarily close to x2, we can make the left hand side arbitrar-
ily close to zero, while the right hand side is bounded away from zero, thus violating
equation (A.1), which is a contradiction.
It follows that for equation (A.1) to hold for all possible choices of x2, y2, a necessary
condition is
β1 + β2 = 0 (A.3)
Starting from equation (A.2) and using exactly the same argument, it follows that a further
necessary condition for equation (A.1) to hold for all possible choices of x2, y2 is given by
µ1 β1 + µ2 β2 = 0. (A.4)
However, it is easy to see that the necessary conditions (A.3) and (A.4) can only be sat-
isfied if both β1 and β2 are 0. To see this, write the necessary conditions (A.3) and (A.4)
as (
1 1
µ1 µ2
)(
β1
β2
)
=
(
0
0
)
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Since the first matrix on the left hand side has rank 2 (the determinant is µ2− µ1 > 0), the
only solution is β1 = β2 = 0.
It follows that equation (A.1) cannot be satisfied for all possible choices of x2, y2 unless
all β-values are 0, implying that it must be possible to have some value x2, y2 for which
M(2) has rank 2.
A.3.2 Step 2: M(k) has full rank if M(k− 1) has full rank
Suppose M(k− 1) is full rank but M(k) has rank k− 1 for all possible values of the prize
vector (xk, yk). Then there exists (β1, . . . , βk) not all zero such that for every value of
(xk, yk),
k
∑
t=1
βt~ct = 0, (A.5)
where~ct is the t-th column vector 
φ′(µt, x1, y1)
...
φ′(µt, xk, yk)

Since ∑kt=1 βt φ
′(µt, xk, yk) = 0 for all possible values of (xk, yk)where not all βt values are
0, we get the following result.
Lemma 2. Consider any k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The assumption that equation (A.5) holds for all values
of the prize vector (xk, yk) implies that for any ℓ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k},
k
∑
t=1
βt µ
ℓ−1
t φ
(ℓ)(µt, xk, yk) = 0, (A.6)
where φ(ℓ)(·) denotes the ℓ-th partial derivative of φ(·) with respect to xk, and where not all values
of βt are zero.
Proof: Note that we have assumed that all derivatives of φ(·) of orders up to k exist and
are non-zero almost everywhere.
Also note that since we assume equation (A.5) holds, the equation is true for ℓ = 1 by
assumption.
33
Fix any yk. Let
g(x, ℓ) ≡
k
∑
t=1
βtµ
ℓ−1
t φ
(ℓ)(µt, x, yk).
and suppose that g(x, 1) = 0 for all values of x.
Consider the case of ℓ = 2. Suppose g(x, 2) 6= 0 for some value of x. Specifically, suppose
g(x, 2) > 0 for some x. By continuity, there is some non-empty interval [a, b] of values
of x such that g(x, 2) > 0 on (a, b). In this case if we choose x ∈ (a, b), then by raising x
slightly g(x, 1) can be raised. Therefore it cannot be true that g(x, 1) = 0 for all values of
x, which is a contradiction.
Now, for any ℓ ∈ 2, . . . , k, suppose g(x, ℓ − 1) = 0 for all values of x. This implies that
g(x, ℓ) = 0 for all values of x. To see this, suppose g(x, ℓ) > 0 for some value of x. As
above, this implies that g(x, ℓ) > 0 for values of x in some interval (a, b). Choosing x in
the interval and then raising x would then raise g(·, ℓ− 1) above 0, which is a contradic-
tion.
This proves that if g(x, ℓ− 1) = 0 for all values of x, then g(x, ℓ) = 0 for all values of x.
Since we have shown that g(x, 1) = g(x, 2) = 0 for all values of x, it follows that g(x, ℓ) =
0 for all values of ℓ = 1, . . . , k. This completes the proof.‖
The next result derives some necessary conditions for equation (A.5) to hold for all prize
vectors.
Lemma 3. Consider any k ∈ {2, . . . , n}. The following conditions are necessary for equa-
tion (A.5) to hold for all prize vectors (xk, yk). For any ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k},
k
∑
t=1
βtµ
ℓ−1
t = 0, (A.7)
where not all values of βt are 0.
Proof: Fix any ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k} and suppose
k
∑
t=1
βtµ
ℓ−1
t 6= 0. (A.8)
34
From Lemma 2, we know that a necessary condition for equation (A.5) to hold for all
prize vectors (xk, yk) is equation (A.6):
k
∑
t=1
βt µ
ℓ−1
t φ
(ℓ)(µt, xk, yk) = 0.
The equation above can be written as
k−1
∑
t=1
βt µ
ℓ−1
t
(
φ(ℓ)(µt, xk, yk)− φ
(ℓ)(µk, xk, yk)
)
= −
k
∑
t=1
βt µ
ℓ−1
t φ
(ℓ)(µk, xk, yk)
It follows from equation (A.8) that the right hand side is not 0.
By choosing yk very close to xk we can make the left hand side as small as we like, while
the right hand side gets close to
−
k
∑
t=1
βt µ
ℓ−1
t φ
(ℓ)(µk, xk, xk)
which is bounded away from zero. It follows that equation (A.6) is violated. This is a
contradiction. This proves the result.‖
Writing the necessary conditions given by lemma 3 in matrix form, we get
1 1 . . . 1
µ1 µ2 . . . µk
µ21 µ
2
2 . . . µ
2
k
...
... . . .
...
µk−11 µ
k−1
2 . . . µ
k−1
k


β1
β2
...
...
βk

=

0
0
...
...
0

Now, letV(k) denote the first matrix on the left hand side. The transpose of V(k) is a k× k
Vandermonde matrix. It follows that16
det(V(k)T) = ∏
16i<j6n
(µj − µi).
Since µj 6= µi for any j 6= i, the determinant is non-zero. Therefore the rank of V(k)
T is
k. Since taking a transpose does not change rank (or, indeed, the determinant), V(k) has
full rank as well.
16This is a standard result in matrix algebra. See, for example, Horn and Johnson (2013), chapter 0.9.11.
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Since V(k) has full rank, there is a unique solution for the β-values. Since βt = 0 for all
t = 1, . . . , k is a solution, this must be the only solution.
This implies that the null-space of the minor M(k) contains only the zero-vector, implying
that M(k) has k linearly independent columns, indicating that R(M(k)) = k.
Thus, starting from the assumption that M(k − 1) has full rank, we have shown that we
can find a prize vector xk, yk such that M(k) has full rank. We have also shown that
M(2) has full rank. It follows by induction that M(k) can have full rank for all values of
k ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Since M(n) is simply the matrix A, this proves that we can find n prize
vectors such that A has full rank.
A.4 Step 2.1 in the proof of Theorem 3
In the paper, we showed that it is not possible to satisfy equation (5.2) if n 6= m using ex-
amples. We present the general proof here, which uses the same ideas as in the examples.
Note that since F̂ = Â−1AF, and F̂ is n× 1, Â−1Amust have at least one non-zero element
in each row. It follows that for equation (A.9) to hold, the following must hold:
each µ̂i must be equal to some µj. (❋)
Case A: n > m: If n > m, it is not possible to satisfy condition (❋) for all µ̂i since there are
more values µ̂i than values µj.
Case B: n < m: Let Z be a n× (m− n) matrix with typical element denoted by zij. Let In
denote the n× n identity matrix. Let ki, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be n numbers such that 1 6 k1 <
k2 . . . < kn 6 m. Let Z⊕ In denote an augmented matrix that inserts columns from In in
the Z matrix as follows: the first column of In is inserted after the (k1 − 1)-th column of
Z, second column of In inserted after the (k2 − 2)-th column of Z and so on until the last
column of In inserted after the (kn − n)-th column of Z.
Let Z1 denote the matrix formed by the first (k1 − 1) > 0 columns of Z, Z2 denote the
matrix formed by the next (k2 − k1− 1) > 0 columns of Z and so on until Zn+1 formed by
the last (km−n − km−n−1− 1) > 0 columns of Z. The augmented matrix has the following
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form:
Z⊕ In ≡
Z1

1
0
...
0
Z2

0
1
...
0
 . . . Zn

0
0
...
1
 Zn+1

k1-th k2-th kn-th
col col col
Recall that condition (5.2) requires Â−1A = M̂−1Â−1AM. Note that Â−1A is n×m with
typical element zij, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. The matrix M̂
−1Â−1AM is
also n×m with typical element
µj
µ̂i
zij. Thus condition (5.2) requires
zij =
µj
µ̂i
zij (A.9)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Note that this either requires zij = 0, or if zij 6= 0,
then µj = µ̂i.
The proof proceeds through the following Lemma. Let Z0 denote an n× (m− n) matrix
where each element in the matrix is 0.
Lemma 4. To satisfy equation (5.2), a necessary condition is that the matrix Â−1A is of the form
Z0 ⊕ In.
Proof: To satisfy condition (❋), let ki, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be such that µ̂i = µki , where 1 6
k1 < k2 . . . < kn 6 m. In this case, the matrix Â is simply the matrix formed by columns
k1, k2, . . . , kn of matrix A. It follows that Â
−1A is of the form Z⊕ In.
Given this, each row has one element 1. Consider row i. The element in the ki-th column
is 1. Suppose some zij 6= 0 where j 6= ki. Then equation (A.9) would require µ̂i = µj. This
is impossible since we already have µ̂i = µki . It follows that row i must have zij = 0 for
all j 6= ki. This implies that all elements of the matrix Z must be 0. It follows that Â
−1A is
of the form Z0 ⊕ In. This completes the proof of Lemma 4.‖
Since F̂ = Â−1AF, and Â−1A is of the form Z0⊕ In (from Lemma 4 above), it follows that
f̂i = fki .
But since n < m, {k1, . . . , kn} is a strict subset of {1, . . . ,m}, it follows that ∑
n
i=1 f̂i =
∑
n
i=1 f̂ki < 1, which is impossible. Therefore we can rule out the case n < m.
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Above we ruled out n > m and n < m. This proves the claim in step 2.1 that we cannot
have n 6= m.‖
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